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The Nature of Politics. Roger D. Masters. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1989. Review by Paul Fairchild, University of Kansas. 
This work poses the question whether gains in the knowledge of human 
biology, behavior, and social interaction provide a basis for conclusions in 
the realm of political theory. As suggested by the book's title, Masters 
adopts an Aristotelian approach to argue that the question can be answered 
in the affirmative. Stated simply, his thesis holds that we can choose among 
possible structures of political organization more intelligently when we take 
into account what is known about human nature from the study of 
evolution, game theory, animal behavior, biology, and linguistics. General 
political institutions can be selected on a rational basis by examining the 
empirical evidence about human nature. That evidence, Masters believes, 
would support a more detailed description of human nature than could be 
contained in a simple formulation such as "rational animal" or any other 
brief definition. It would have to take into account the connection between 
such matters as the functioning of DNA as a carrier of information in genetic 
activity and the functioning of language in social discourse as well as the 
discoveries of anthropology and ethology. 
Such a far-reaching and ambitious project does not deny the normative 
character of politics, seeking to replace it with biological necessity, but does 
direct us to look at biological evidence for the support of such norms. 
Masters anticipates two major objections to his view. He expressly denies 
that it involves the naturalistic fallacy by arguing that the derivation of value 
from scientific knowledge occurs in many instances, for example, in 
discovering the value of not smoking from the scientific evidence that 
smoking causes cancer. Although this argument may be missing a premise: 
that health is the ultimate desideratum in this situation, one not based on 
scientific knowledge, any evidence that human nature tends to support 
certain political forms over others should not be ignored. For social norms 
themselves are, in Master's view, products of human nature. As we learn 
more about human nature, we learn more about human society and politics. 
Like Aristotle, Masters sees humans as naturally social, and, because we 
employ language, as naturally political. But he uses the term "natural" in a 
way Aristotle would not, to include the evolutionary past as evidence of the 
kind of beings we are. In that way, human nature is a changing one, 
dependent on its past, uncertain as to its future. 
Such a nature, according to Masters, can be explained neither in a 
deterministic way nor relativistically. He takes issue with the positivist 
tradition that would look for advancement in human science along the lines 
of physics. He argues that evolutionary biology has shown that individual 
variation is too broad to allow application of anything like mechanistic 
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principles to the study of humans. Cultural differences prevent similar rules 
from being applied to social groupings. 
Me traces moral relativism in modern times to Nietzsche, arguing that it 
represents the opposite position from determinism. Between these extremes 
one finds what Masters calls naturalism, the position purportedly reinforced 
by biology. He relies on the predominance of some human features and 
behavioral forms over long periods of evolutionary time as showing that we 
do not make ourselves, that what we are results from genetic influences as 
well as personal choice, environment, cultural pressures, and other causes. 
Naturalism takes all of these into account by seeing morality as persistent, 
but not rigid, modified by time and place, but broadly shared. 
Unlike the moral theory of Kant, that of Masters lacks a priori elements 
and is subject to qualifications imposed by concrete circumstances. It lacks 
universal principles of morality, but contains a natural morality and a 
natural justice in political matters. Masters looks upon these in biological, 
even medical terms, describing justice in terms of social health, its absence as 
an illness. His notion of morality recognizes the complexity of human 
nature and the variety of situations without constituting relativism. 
The second objection anticipated by Masters is that of the 
nature/nurture distinction. Humans are biologically fitted to be political. In 
the first instance, they are social, dependent upon a social way of life for 
survival and comfort. In the second, they are able to produce speech and 
with that to fashion a way of life that permits large-scale organization. Even 
though through most of the human past people lived in relatively small 
groups where face-to-face relations made the state unnecessary, Masters 
does not view life in the modern state as a departure from a natural 
condition. Rather, it constitutes a further development of what preceded it, 
not by necessity nor by conscious choice, but as political organization taking 
on a life of its own. At all times it remains the expression of human nature. 
Theories of politics such as those of Hobbes and Rousseau fail to take into 
account the more advanced knowledge of human nature available today. As 
a result, contractarian theories of political association must be rejected if they 
rest on any suggestion that acceptance of the limitations on personal action 
inherent in political organization runs counter to a nature that is solitary, 
selfish, and independent. According to Masters, available anthropological 
evidence indicates that humans have always been social, that some measure 
of altruism appears in the interpretation of the use of the earliest artifacts, 
showing such practices as burial, art, education, and cooperation. 
What distinguishes the modern state from its predecessor for Masters is 
its hierarchical structure and its formal constitution as a state of a particular 
kind. Because it supports greater specialization and, for the individual, 
absence of a need to interact with all others, what Masters calls total 
reciprocity, it frees the individual from the restraints imposed by the need 
for consensus, allows even greater variety of expression, and leads to a large 
increase in social diversity. The means of social control, which in the 
hunger-gatherer society consisted of moral censure of the entire group, in 
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the modern state consist of enforced ostracism, carried out by assigned 
agents. It is in this feature of modern government that Masters sees the 
greatest possibility for differentiating political structures available for 
rational choice today. The reasons for ostracism and the alternatives to it 
will vary as a state is authoritarian or democratic. 
In Chapter 7, Masters refers to a work of Albert O. Hirschman entitled 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. The three terms in the title correspond to what 
Masters sees as three modes of political participation. When conflict occurs 
in a social group, these represent the options for dealing with it. Exit allows 
one or more individuals to break off from the group and seek new 
associations. Voice represents attempts to influence the situation through 
complaint or argument. And loyalty represents the acquiescence to existing 
social conditions when these are disapproved. Masters argues that 
totalitarian societies demand loyalty and deprive dissidents of voice and of 
opportunity for exit. Democratic societies, on the other hand, desire loyalty, 
but extend to ail the opportunity to participate (voice) and the opportunity 
to exit, at least individually. This arrangement he sees as characteristic of 
primitive societies and as normative for more advanced political structures. 
His argument does not assume the superiority of primitive groups. Rather, 
the less self-conscious practices of primitive groups tell more about human 
social nature than do the deliberate policies of modern societies, especially 
where those policies result from a large disparity in social influence and 
power. 
Masters exhibits restraint in describing the political nature of humans. 
From the great detail of knowledge available concerning the biology, 
evolution, and sociology of human life he might have drawn more detailed 
conclusions about politics. That he did not suggests something about what 
he takes to be the political consequences to be drawn, that is, about 
democratic institutions themselves. He seems to suggest that no one, not 
even a careful student of the underlying sciences, can properly prescribe the 
detailed features of political life for groups who must find their own 
prescriptions. Beyond the most fundamental structures of social 
participation there are, for Masters, no a priori answers to questions that face 
political groups. To be political means to engage in the search for the 
answers and to seek to apply them in formal ways to the life of the group. 
The drive to act in this way he sees as deeply human, not as an acquired 
interest of the few who seek power. 
This conclusion is, I think, inarguable. If we are political by nature, then 
we are all political as mature adults and any effort to limit political 
participation to the few would be seen as an effort to deny or to violate 
human nature. But the problem for Masters is to show what is meant by 
"nature" and especially "human nature," given the opposition to such 
language by existentialists, pragmatists, and others. His approach to the 
problem consists in seeking to avoid the kind of superficial definition of 
human nature that became the target of criticism and to replace it with one 
which includes and accounts for all the evidence. Such a definition can 
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hardly be a brief label. Rather, it must take into account the diversity of 
individual characteristics and of cultural forms. The picture of human 
nature that emerges from a scientific examination of all the evidence cannot 
easily be summarized. 
Masters sees in that picture a persistent teleology, a seeking after human 
good both for the individual and for society. While conceptions of the good 
vary among societies and individuals, Masters believes that the attempt to 
understand what constitutes the good belongs both to scientists and 
philosophers, just as it belongs to all people to decide what is in their own 
interest and in the interest of their groups. He proposes three principles of 
justice based on twentieth-century evolutionary biology: respect for the 
individual along with what this implies about equality and cultural 
diversity; duties of virtue derived from social obligation; and a concern for 
human justice. He does not describe these principles in detail, but offers 
them as features of "the new naturalism," features that rediscover "the 
soundness of the Western tradition." 
Whether Masters' conclusions will gain broad acceptance depends as 
much on the direction of future science as on that of philosophy. But his 
effort to reformulate the Aristotelian position and to ground it in 
contemporary biology deserves careful consideration in a world grown 
skeptical of both science and politics. 
Confrontations loilh the Reaper. Fred Feldman. Oxford University Press, 1992. 
XIV + 249 pages. Reviewed by Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Kansas. 
Feld man's primary aim for his book is to defend two commonsensical 
claims about death. The first is that the nature of death is essentially 
mysterious. The second is that death is most always a very serious, and 
usually the most serious, sort of harm that can befall a person. These claims 
may seem so obvious as to require no argument. But as Feldman shows, a 
number of astute philosophers have called each into question. Answering 
their arguments leads us into one of the most philosophically rigorous 
treatments of the questions regarding the nature and value of death. 
The claim that death is essentially mysterious might mean either (1) that 
we do not know what it would be like to be dead, or (2) that we cannot 
define death. Feldman is interested in (2), since he claims, rightly, that there 
is nothing it is like to be dead—to be dead is to be incapable of experiencing 
anything whatever. Feldman's claim that death is mysterious is the claim 
that no philosopher (himself included) has yet been able to provide a set of 
conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions to define death. 
The most intuitive way to capture what it means to be dead is to 
identify death with the cessation of life. In keeping with the maxim of not 
defining the obscure by the yet more obscure, we are taken through two 
chapters (2,3) in which we come to grips with the notion of life. There are 
two major routes to take. The life-functional theories of life identify certain 
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things that living entities d as essential to their being living things. Vitalist 
theories of life identify certain things that beings possess as crucial to defining 
life. Both families of theory fail. 
No set of functions comprises necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for a thing's being alive. The most plausible and historically prominent 
candidates-nutritive, reproductive or rational capacities-all fail, as do other 
less historically important alternatives. Living plants lack rational capacities; 
living humans lack reproductive capacities; and certain living moths lack 
nutritive capacities. Efforts to alter the definitions so that one is alive just in 
case one is a member of a species most of whose members possess the 
relevant "life-functions" also fails. For this move allows dead members to 
count as living-a dead butterfly is still a butterfly, and so satisfies the 
amended definition. 
Nor is there any sort of "stuff," possession of which entails and is 
entailed by being alive. DNA and RNA are the most obvious choices, but it 
is at least conceptually possible that alien beings who act and think like us 
are composed of something else—say, ZN A. That this is not actually the case 
is irrelevant. Feldman is engaged in a conceptual exploration. An 
appropriate definition of life must accommodate all conceivable 
counterexamples. 
Feldman next has us assume that we can fully understand what it is for 
a thing to be alive. Still, it does not follow that to be dead is to cease to be 
alive. Living cells or embryos that are frozen and later successfully thawed 
have ceased for a time to be alive, yet have not died. Suppose that someday 
human cryogenics is perfected. During the time that frozen humans exist in 
suspended animation, it appears that they are neither alive nor dead. Yet 
they have ceased to live—they are not engaged in any metabolic activity, any 
growth, motion, etc. Nor does it help to add the conditions that one cease 
permanently and irreversibly to be alive. A series of ingenious examples 
(pp.63-5), too intricate to describe here, helps Feldman make his case. 
Further, there are fusion and fission cases that buttress Feldman's 
contentions. It seems odd to speak of a living cell that divides into two as 
dying, yet it ceases to live. Similarly, two living cells that fuse with one 
another to create a new, single cell have both ceased to live, yet have not 
(according to linguistic intuitions I share with Feldman) died. Cases of 
fusion, fission and suspended animation all cast doubt on the claim that to 
die is identical with ceasing to be alive. 
Nor is it the case that to be dead is to cease to exist. The claim that 
death entails ceasing to exist is called the "termination thesis." Feldman 
rejects it. One may be dead and yet exist (though one's existence won't 
involve any conscious experiences). As Feldman notes, there is an 
ambiguity in the notion of "existence." One may exist qua F, or exist 
simpliciter. The termination thesis concerns only the latter notion. 
Adherents of the termination thesis claim that when one dies, one ceases to 
exist, period (in a way that an incinerated table no longer exists (as a table or 
anything else]). They think that an antemortem being is a fundamentally 
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different thing from its postmortem remains; when a person dies, she goes 
out of existence and a new thing—a corpse—replaces her. Feldman 
disagrees. If the termination thesis were correct, we could not say of a 
deceased pet that it was once alive, since there is no single "it" of which we 
could predicate both life and death. An apparently innocuous sentence like 
"My Aunt Ethel died last week and we're burying her tomorrow"(93) 
becomes paradoxical. Feldman combines an appeal to deep-rooted linguistic 
intuitions (92-5) with attacks on the major arguments favoring the thesis (96-
104). I found the combination persuasive. 
Feldman has shown that being dead is not identical to ceasing to be 
alive, or ceasing to exist. The last set of conceptual difficulties Feldman 
tackles is that of dying as a process. What does it mean to say that someone 
is dying? We want to avoid a definition that is too liberal—it cannot mean 
simply that one will die eventually, since everyone would satisfy the 
definition, yet most of us aren't presently dying (except perhaps in a 
figurative sense). We also want to avoid a definition that's too restrictive--
we don't want to ensure that a dying being will actually die of the thing 
causing it to die. Miracle cures can intervene. Feldman considers all the 
most prominent candidate definitions and rightly concludes that they 
fail.(74-80) 1 Feldman does attempt to offer an analysis of dying, employing 
the notion of being in a terminal state (a notion he does define [841), but 
acknowledges a number of gaps in his analysis. He concludes that dying, 
like the notions of death, being dead and being alive, escape precise analysis. 
They remain mysterious. 
Feldman does offer some positive conclusions specifying relations 
between being dead, existing, being alive and dying. (Chapter 7) But I found 
these less interesting than his mostly critical remarks and arguments in the 
rest of Part I. Though not optimistic about the prospects for conceptual 
analysis in this domain, Feldman rightly operates on the assumption that 
such analysis is a necessary preliminary for the axiological arguments that 
get most people interested in the philosophical issues surrounding death. 
His arguments in Part I are rigorous. He is invariably fair to the opponents 
he is criticizing, and generous in interpretation. One of the most fruitful of 
philosophical enterprises is to show us how ingrained assumptions (eg, 
about the transparency of notions like death and life) are mistaken, and how 
difficult it might be to remedy them. Feldman does just this. Part I of 
Feldman's book would be an excellent corrective to those who think that the 
enterprise of conceptual analysis is a sterile and profitless business. 
In the second part of the book, Feldman tackles the perennial problems 
surrounding the (dis)value of death. He begins with a useful expository 
1 Consider the most popular conception: dying is a matter of being engaged 
in a process that will, absent interference, shortly or prematurely end with 
one's death. However, a ninety-year old may be walking across a street, 
about to be fatally hit by an eighteen-wheeler, yet not be dying. The 
definition thus fails. 
BOOK REVIEWS 173 
chapter (Ch. 8) on Epicurus' argument that death cannot be an evil for the 
person who dies. Suffering entails a subject of suffering, and "where death 
is, we are not." Since we cannot suffer from death, death is no harm. 
Feldman nicely dissolves several confusions in the Epicurean argument as a 
prelude to his own account of the evil of death. Death is a misfortune, when 
it is, because of the value it deprives those who would otherwise live. The 
novelty of Feldman's "deprivation account" rests in his analysis of extrinsic 
value. Feldman claims that being dead is not intrinsically bad. If bad at all, 
it must be extrinsically so. But this raises problems, for it is thought that to 
be extrinsically bad is just to cause something intrinsically bad to occur. If 
death is not itself intrinsically disvaluable, and doesn't cause anything 
intrinsically bad to occur, how can it be extrinsically bad? 
Feldman's answer rests on a counterfactual analysis of extrinsic value. 
He claims that "the extrinsic value for S of P = the difference between the 
intrinsic value for S of the life S would lead if P is true and the intrinsic value 
for S of the life that S would lead if P is false."(150) On this account, S's death 
may be very (extrinsically) bad indeed, since remaining alive might hold the 
prospect of much intrinsic value, whereas being dead brings none. This 
account also shows how one needn't exist during the occurrence of an event 
that is extrinsically bad. The activity of planting a bomb set to go off in six 
years is extrinsically bad for the five year old killed in the explosion. 
Similarly, says Feldman, even if we grant the termination thesis, the "fact" 
that we do not exist when dead is insufficient to show that we are not 
harmed by death. 
I'm not sure that Feldman has successfully solved "the problem of the 
subject"~who it is that gets harmed by death. To see this, consider a related 
puzzle about death—when to date the harm that occurs. If we date it before 
death, then no harm has yet occurred, if after, then no subject exists to be 
harmed. Feldman claims that the harm should be dated "eternally," because 
(when death is a harm) it will always be the case that the difference in 
intrinsic value of a continued life and death is such that death is extrinsically 
bad. But this seems unsatisfactory. Imagine conducting a homicide 
investigation and asking when the wrong was inflicted. "Eternally" isn't 
very helpful. We want a time, presumably the time at which our victim 
expired. But then we are confronted all over again with the problem of 
dating, for the time of expiration brings with it the death of the subject, and 
prior to the death there was no harm (assume, for simplicity's sake, that 
death was instantaneous). The problem of dating seems to force a 
reconsideration of Feldman's response to the problem of the subject, which 
in turn forces reconsideration of his notion of extrinsic value. I cannot 
pursue this farther here. For those interested, the relevant discussions occur 
at pp. 138-154. 
Feldman next moves to the problem of explaining the wrongness of 
killing. He endorses a version of act utilitarianism that couples a maximizing 
strategy with a "justicist" theory of value. Acts are right if they maximize the 
fit between what people deserve and what they receive, wrong otherwise. 
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The reason that killing is (ordinarily) wrong is because it fails to give the 
victim what he deserves, and confers an undeserved benefit on the killer. 
For those cases where we believe the killing justified, it is because we think 
the decedent deserved to die, or the decedent's continued life stood in the 
way of the desert of too many others. 
Feldman applies his "Justicist Act Utilitarianism" [JAU] to the problems 
of abortion and euthanasia, arguing, in the abortion case, that its moral 
status differs with the stage of pregnancy. At early points, abortion is no 
wrong, since the mother deserves to be happy and the fetus does not deserve 
to be sustained. Later, however, the fetus has "put in its time" and so 
deserves to live, and its desert may well override that of a woman's to be 
happy and autonomous. 
I think the abortion chapter is the least plausible in Feldman's bixik. Its 
implausibility forces a reconsideration of JAU. Though Feldman thinks it a 
merit of his account that he avoids ambiguous or vague concepts like 
"person" or "right to life," I think he has traded one difficulty for another. 
The notion of "desert" is anything but perspicuous. Unlike his rigorous 
analytical treatments of concepts like death and life, Feldman pays scant 
attention to the intricacies of the notion of desert. If, as I strongly suspect, 
"desert" is not univocal 2 ' then Feldman will be left with the problem of 
trying to maximize over several variables (each of the different senses of 
"desert"). Even if "desert" were univocal, the problem would remain, for 
there is more than one ground or basis on which we apportion desert 
(talents, effort, capacity, etc.) and the problem would repeat itself at this 
level. 
Another problem for his account is that he never argues for the 
dubitable claim that people deserve to live or be happy. Killing is wrong only 
if people ordinarily deserve to be alive. That this claim requires defense 
becomes quite clear in the abortion discussions.(200-205) There Feldman 
argues that an eight month fetus deserves to live and experience the joys of 
living because it has already made a "substantial investment," having 
undergone months of boredom.(203) Regardless of whether this is an 
empirically accurate description of fetal experience, we have to ask about the 
underlying conception of desert at work here. Earlier on the same page 
Feldman describes the premature deaths of two women as "great injustices," 
despite the fact that no wrongdoing was involved. It seems that he is 
confusing the notion of what is due, owed or deserved and that of what it 
would be good to have or experience. We can all agree that it is a good thing 
for most now living to continue to live. But that is different from showing 
that they deserve to do so. Only if they do do we have an explanation for 
the wrongness of killing. 
Feldman's comments about fetal investment would indicate that he 
believes justice to be properly apportioned to individual effort. But this 
2 Cf. J. Feinberg, "Justice and Peronal Desert", in Doing and Deserving 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
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raises some problems. First, what do people deserve? How are we to 
correlate their efforts and their desert? Feldman repeatedly speaks as if 
people deserve to be happy and to live. But what sort of effort on their part 
would confer this, would make life and happiness their due? One of the 
putative benefits Feldman cites for his account over those involving a right 
to life is that the latter accounts tend to make possession of the right an all or 
nothing affair. He allows for degrees of desert: an embryo does not deserve 
to live, though a third trimester fetus does. But if desert is apportioned to 
effort, why isn't it the case that those who have "invested more" better 
deserve to live? 3 And why is it that their efforts, whatever they may be, 
entail that they deserve happiness and life, as opposed to anything else? 
Secondly, Feldman owes us an account of how to measure desert, in a 
way that allows for interpersonal comparisons. The maximization strategy 
relies on such an account. These are notoriously difficult to provide, and it is 
not surprising that in a relatively short book Feldman should avoid 
providing it. But vindication of his theory awaits this development. 
Third, the theory, as with all maximizing forms of consequential ism, 
may be too demanding. Whether this is so is a vexed question. But making 
failure to maximize justice a sufficient condition of wrongdoing is 
presumptive, if rebuttable, evidence that the theory is too stringent in its 
demands. 
Fourth, JAU may not be able to avoid the problems of distributive 
justice that Feldman hoped would set it apart from other forms of 
utilitarianism. It is possible to maximize the amount of fit between what is 
deserved and received by doing a grave injustice to some small number of 
people. We might kill a wealthy landlord and redistribute her possessions to 
hundreds of peasants, whose strenuous efforts are likely to have entitled 
them to something more than they were receiving. Some scenario of this 
sort seems possible. 4 Since this is so, JAU may license killing where we 
think it gravely inappropriate. Admittedly, generating counterintuitive 
consequences is insufficient to condemn a moral theory. However, Feldman 
staked the fate of JAU on being able to account for intuitions about familiar 
problem cases (killing one to save five by distributing the deceased's organs, 
etc.). Failure to comport with deeply held intuitions about the justification 
of killing would, on his own terms, likely be a quite serious theoretical 
liability. 
3 This problem may lead Feldman to adjust the basis of allocating desert, so 
that what we deserve depends on our capacities rather than efforts. But this 
seems to introduce all the old problems of identifying morally relevant 
features that will ground a right to life, something Feldman explicitly wants 
to avoid. 
4 Perhaps Feldman would say that the life she deserved overrides the 
possessions the peasants deserved. Possibly. But possibly not. This shows 
the need for some sort of interpersonal measure of desert. He might also say 
that the peasants don't deserve the land. But if that's so, we need a more 
sophisticated measure of what people deserve than their efforts, and we 
need a way to establish just what it is that people are due. 
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Despite these worries, I think Feldman's book a significant contribution 
to the literature. His book is lucid enough to be profitably read by intelligent 
nonspecialists-it would, in fact, make a very suitable text for a medical 
ethics or applied ethics course. The book is exceptionally well-organized, 
very clearly argued and written, and filled with imaginative examples. All 
those interested in the philosophical issues surrounding death will learn a 
great deal from coming to grips with Feldman's work. 
Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosoph}/. Rudiger Safranski (translated 
by Ewald Osers). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1990. Reviewed by Lance Byron Richey, Marquette University. 
In this excellent intellectual biography, Rudiger Safranski achieves the 
near impossible: a loving examination of perhaps the most unlovable of all 
modern philosophers, Arthur Schopenhauer. This biography should prove 
enjoyable and informative to anyone interested in the culture and politics of 
19th century Germany, and may well become required reading for 
Schopenhauer scholars. Rich in detail (especially those of the more titillating 
sort) and scrupulously researched, Safranski's work does an excellent job of 
revealing the philosophical, cultural and political forces which shaped 
Schopenhauer's thought, and also tries to provide some psychological 
insight into the mind of one of the greatest philosophers of that complex 
century. 
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the book is the account given of 
Schopenhauer's turbulent relationship with his parents, the reverberations of 
which surfaced again and again throughout his life. The suicide of his 
merchant father when he was 17 left Arthur financially secure for life, but 
also left him without a paternal figure from whom to find approval, a loss 
keenly felt by him. Arthur's mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, through her 
resultant success as a literary figure in her own right, and her refusal to be 
overshadowed and controlled by the memory of her dead husband, doomed 
her always formal relationship with her son to be more and more strained as 
Arthur sought his own place in the sun. Before his 25th birthday, 
Schopenhauer's relationship with his mother collapsed entirely, with her 
writing him, saying "you a re...irritable and unbearable, and I consider it 
most difficult to live with you.... If you were less like you are, you would 
only be ridiculous, but thus you are most annoying" (91). Few he would 
encounter in life would find much kinder words for him, with the notable 
exception of Goethe. 
Arthur's friendship with him sprang from Goethe's close friendship 
with Johanna. While never close friends due to their differences in 
temperament, Goethe and Schopenhauer shared a common enemy, namely, 
Newton and his theory of light. A high point of the book is its extended 
treatment of Goethe's theory of color, and its influence on Schopenhauer's 
O H Seeing and Colors. I know of no finer overview of the issues, both 
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psychological and personal, involved in this work. While their friendship 
was a somewhat short one, Goethe's last remarks on him were friendly and 
positive, a true rarity in Schopenhauer's life. 
Equally admirable is the effort given to placing Schopenhauer's 
philosophy in its historical context, and Safranski does a better job than most 
historians of philosophy in bringing out the salient points in Kant's 
philosophy, and tracing them through their Fichtean transformation. 
Several chapters are devoted to Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly The 
World as Will and Representation, accurately and enticingly presenting the 
deep existential angst behind it, as well as the immediate circumstances 
under which it was composed. Perhaps the finest service done to 
Schopenhauer is the relegation of Nietzsche to the margins of the discussion. 
Safranski consistently resists the temptation to let Schopenhauer's "greatest 
disciple" (341) dominate the interpretation and overshadow the importance 
of Schopenhauer's philosophical enterprise. Little is read backwards into 
Schopenhauer, while much of what followed is referenced, without forcing it 
into the spotlight. 
The historical situation surrounding Schopenhauer's life is displayed 
brilliantly, and the reader watches with amazement as the cultural and 
philosophical scene of Germany switches its allegiance from the romantic 
idealism of Arthur's youth to the crass materialism of his old age. Hegel, 
Schelling, Marx, Feuerbach, and others dance in the margins of the book, 
entering occasionally to change the scenery, and to remark upon the 
evolution of thought which finally allowed Schopenhauer, in his last years, 
to enjoy a taste of the fame and acceptance he had sought throughout his 
life. The petty politics of the German city-states are interspersed with the 
figures of Napoleon and Metternich, and the rise of Industrialization finds 
its climax in the revolution of 1848 and Schopenhauer's panicked 
condemnation of it, as well as his complicity in its suppression. 
Safranski is wise enough to let history take center stage when 
Schopenhauer's life settled into the dull routine it followed for the last thirty 
years of his life. The last chapters focus more on the rejection of idealism 
and the embracing of science by German culture in the forties and fifties, 
which set the stage for Schopenhauer's belated success. I lis Aphorisms for 
Practical Wistiom, to which he owed his success, is dissected as a compromise 
with the diminished expectations of the German bourgeoisie. The rise of 
ideology is examined at breakneck speed, especially through Marx, along 
with its implications for such an ahistorical thinker as Schopenhauer. At the 
very end, the first movements in the cult of Schopenhauer appear, soon 
enough for Schopenhauer to "interpret his prolonged incognito as the long 
road to truth" (3). 
Despite the wealth of historical, biographical, cultural and personal 
information the book contains, all of which speak strongly in its favor, there 
are some weaknesses as well. Perhaps the most dangerous is the author's 
own idealism, which reveals itself in the thorough treatment given to Kant 
and Fichte. While not in itself objectionable, the philosophically uninitiated 
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may overlook the larger questions and problems surrounding that position, 
and Safranski's defense of Schopenhauer against materialist interpretations 
is, I believe a bit overdrawn, I believe. In an effort to remain true to 
Schopenhauer's Kantian roots, the author closes off other possible 
approaches to him which would probably better serve the contemporary 
Schopenhauer reader. While rigorous philosophical analysis is certainly 
beyond the goal of this book, a certain degree of philosophical open-
mindedness would have better served the reader first encountering as 
important a philosopher as Schopenhauer. 
A less serious flaw, which perhaps is a virtue in this case, is the 
psychological analysis given to both the man and the age in which he lived. 
While at times these interpretations of Schopenhauer's behavior and motives 
are suspect, they never fail to be thought-provoking and intriguing, and the 
author's defense of Kantian ethics against what he considers the modern 
equivalent of the medieval practice of indulgences, namely, modern 
psychology, is rather convincing. Nevertheless, Safranski has a tendency to 
resort to outdated sociological theories of religion and behavior, when 
simply telling the story would suffice. In any case, the thoughtful reader can 
easily separate the interpretation from the facts, and gather much food for 
thought from both. 
While not flawless, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosoph}/ should 
serve as a model for philosophical biography. The author has the good 
sense to realize that some of the greatest philosophical insights are 
motivated more by personalities than by philosophical issues, and to 
distinguish between the two. More importantly, he gives a fair and 
compassionate (indeed, sometimes far too compassionate) account of the life 
and foibles of Arthur Schopenhauer, and if he occasionally shares in 
Schopenhauer's rationalization of his boorish behavior, much more is gained 
by the author's compassion than from the condemnations of many of 
Schopenhauer's other biographers. I can heartily recommend the book, for 
both the bedside and the study. 
Moral Absolutes: An Essay on The Natural and Rationale of Morality. Nicholas 
Rescher, Peter Lang 1989. 115 pages including index. Reviewed by Sterling 
Harwood, San Jose State University. 
This book is admirably clear and concise, thought it has little or not 
originality. But originality if overrated. One can usefully read the book in 
one sitting. Though it is a good introduction to most of the key issues 
involved in rationally supporting an objective morality, and though I agree 
with Rescher that moral relativism and moral skepticism (what he calls 
moral nihilism) are false and that many moral claims are objectively and 
rationally justified, his book ultimately fails to achieve its goal of showing 
Itow moral claims are objectively and rationally justified independently of 
cultural (or individual) moral beliefs or customs. Given the book's brevity, 
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perhaps we can forgive its errors of omission (e.g., ignoring Gewirth's 
arguments on absolute rights) and its oversimplifications (e.g., ignoring 
Mill's qualitative, value-enhancing utilitarianism in dismissing utilitarianism 
(93)). But, as we shall see, Rescher's argument falls into self-contradiction 
and fails to meet the same standards he rightly sets for his opponents. 
Rescher argues that morality is absolute in only 3 of the 5 senses of 
'absolute' he identifies. Unfortunately, Rescher waits until page 76 to 
disambiguate the highly equivocal word 'absolute', a task which should have 
occurred early in Ch. 1. Rescher concludes that morality is absolute in that it 
applies universally to obligatees and beneficiaries, and it is a matter of 
objectively determinable facts established by impersonal standards. Rescher 
concludes that morality is not absolute in the sense of lacking any conditions 
or in the sense of being so decisive as to sweep all other considerations aside. 
Rescher's strategy is to use Ross, Brentano and, especially, Kant as allies. 
Together they oppose Hume, Nietzsche, Marx, and C. L. Stevenson. 
Rescher's alliance also opposes utilitarian economists such as Harsanyi and 
what Rescher calls anthropological reductionism, attempts by Benedict, 
Sumner and others to reduce morality to custom. This makes for quite a fair 
fight! Rescher's strategy in at least four key battles is to argue that moral 
realism (the denial of moral relativism and moral skepticism) is true because 
otherwise important distinction in commonsense moral thinking would be 
lost. This strategy will hardly persuade one who is already a hardened 
moral skeptic, who dismisses commonsense moral thinking as delusional 
anyway. But the inherent appeal of the four distinctions should help 
prevent one from accepting moral skepticism, and give moral skeptics 
second thoughts. 
The first distinction is used to show what Rescher calls the 
"Anthropologists' Fallacy," which is to move from observing the use of 
traditional moral guides to reach moral conclusions to the view that morality 
means whatever moral guidance is traditional. (30) Rescher rightly points 
out the key distinction with an analogy: using multiplication tables 
traditionally in school does not imply that multiplication means using those 
tables. 
The second distinction is between the moral convictions of others and 
one's own moral convictions. Rescher rightly concludes that "I cannot 
consistently look on my own moral convictions as 'mere matters of opinion'." 
(65) For then why would one feel any need to stick to one's convictions? 
Why wouldn't one experiment willy nilly with other moral approaches? A 
relativist or skeptic would guarantee us that such experimentation would 
never lead to any objective moral error. But the cautious approach we 
commonsensically use in changing our moral convictions is consistent only 
with moral realism, which recommends caution due to the realistic 
possibility of moral error in switching moral convictions. 
The third distinction is between that which pleases and that which 
benefits. Rescher says "People are no doubt the definitive authorities 
regarding what pleases them, but certainly not regarding what benefits 
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them. And this objectivity of interests carries in its wake also the objectivity 
of interests-promotion—and thus of morality." (67) A slight problem here for 
Rescher is that his argument is not one for moral realism per se, since some 
moral realist views (e.g., hedonistic utilitarianism) fail to make such a sharp 
distinction between pleasure and benefit. 
The fourth distinction, relying on Brentano, is "that the objectively good 
is not that which we love or desire but that which is worthy or deserving of 
our love or desire." (68) Rescher rejects the position of Marx and Nietzsche--
that morality is merely masked expression of subjective desire-because they 
cannot allow for Brentano's distinction. 
But Rescher cannot dispose of Nietzsche so easily. Rescher morally 
requires benevolence whereas Nietzsche morally requires hating one's 
enemies. But both of them try to ground morality on nature. Nietzsche, in 
Beyond Good And Evil, endorses "the natural origin of morality" and "a 
natural morality." Rescher concludes that morality is objective because 
morality requires us to follow our nature and because it is a "reason-
establishable fact that A is more (or less) consonant with our nature than B 
is." (69) He speaks of what we should do "in virtue of our nature" (79) and 
speaks of "the world's scheme of things" and "the world's interests." (91) 
Rescher morally requires maximal realization of the better part of our 
nature, what we "believe ourselves to be called upon to be." (90) But called 
upon by whom? Not society, for that would be moral relativism. Rescher 
makes the mistake of personifying nature (or the world) and giving no 
argument to support the personification. 1 consider the so-called naturalistic 
fallacy not to be a genuine fallacy, since the is/ought gap can be bridged (as 
Searle, Foot and others have argued). But Rescher's bridge is untenable. 
There are simply too many counterexamples of things natural yet bad (e.g., 
lightning bolts to the temple) and unnatural yet good (e.g., modern 
medicine, ice cream) to endorse his suggestion that whatever is natural or in 
the natural scheme of things is good. Later Rescher distinguishes between 
good and bad parts of our natures. But each is equally natural. So his 
suggestion that nature supports the objectivity of morality must be wrong. 
Consider the insightful exchange in the film 'The Lady From Shanghai:" 
—"One who follows his nature keeps his original nature in the end." 
-"But haven't you heard ever of anything better to follow?" 
Rescher does make a few very brief and very underdeveloped analogies 
between morality and natural sciences, but I expect a book to present much 
more. ( 35&71) 
Another problem is that Rescher cannot consistently ally himself with 
Kant. First, Rescher repeatedly stresses that the central feature of morality is 
interpersonal benevolence (altruism). (1, 4-8, 81, 93 & 103) He endorses the 
universal altruism of the golden rule, do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you. (94) But Kant rejects the golden rule as fundamentally 
inadequate, since it says nothing about duties to oneself, which Kant also 
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considers central to morality. Second, Kant accepts and Kescher rejects 
externalism, the doctrine that belief in an act's morality entails some 
motivation to do it. (6 & 104) Third, Rescher criticizes K. Baier for failing to 
see how thoroughly Kantian rules can be absolutely exceptionless once 
qualified. (10) But then Rescher departs from Kantian consistency by 
qualifying one rule as "Never mislead another merely for your own 
advantage" while insisting that we may mislead a madman simply in order 
to avoid becoming his victim. (11-12) Fourth, Rescher agrees more with Ross 
than with Kant about how decisive moral considerations are. Ross sees 
morality as a set of conflicting prima facie factors that are not necessarily 
decisive and that can outweigh each other in different cases, whereas Kant 
sees morality as a consistent categorical imperative that decisively applies to 
all cases. Rescher tries no direct reconciliation of his view with these views 
of Kant. 
A chance for reconciliation comes in the last chapter when he relies on 
an ethic of self-realization, saying that morality requires us to maximally 
realize our potential for good. But Rescher's reliance on self-realization of 
potential, which is hypothetical, contradicts his view that we must reject 
Baier's attempt to ground morality because it is hypothetical. (82) Moreover, 
Rescher begs the question about whether and how we can objectively tell 
our potential for good from our potential for evil. It merely relocates the 
issue of objectivity rather than showing the objectivity of morality by giving, 
as Rescher aims to do, a Kantian metaphysical or ontological underpinning 
of morality in self-realization. Rescher is as guilty of question-begging here 
as his contractarian opponents (Hobbes and Rousseau) are when they try to 
ground morality on a contract. Rescher rightly notes that contractarians 
simply relocate the question of the objective grounding of morality to the 
question of why we should honor our contracts. (87) Similarly, Rescher 
must show why we should realize only that part of our potential that is 
allegedly for objective good. Incidentally, Rescher is inexplicably dismissive 
of political morality or values, which he conceives of as sharply distinct from 
moral values. (9 & 88) Further, Rescher fails to explain adequately how he 
can consistently accept maximal self-realization as the foundation of 
morality and reject egoistic moralities due to their opportunism and their 
self-centeredness. (4-8, 81 & 103) He also fails to explain why the self-
realization must be maximal rather than merely adequate. Why isn't good 
enough when it comes to self-realization? 
Finally, Rescher addresses the question "Why be moral?" "Why should I 
act morally?" puts the matter more clearly and concretely. Rescher agrees 
that H. A. Frichard has correctly answered this question. Rescher says "it 
makes no real sense to ask 'Why should I be moral?' For once an act is 
recognized as being the morally appropriate thing to do, there is really no 
room for any further question..." Rescher suggests the question resembles 
"Why believe the true?" to which one should answer, simply, because it is 
true. The true is always inherently worthy of belief. No further reason for 
belief is needed. One may object that Rescher commits the fallacy of false 
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analogy, since belief is so involuntary and since voluntariness is the 
hallmark of actions for which we are morally responsible. But 1 think the 
question "Why should I act morally?" can be answered after trying to 
understand its component question "Should I act morally?" "Should I act 
morally?" which we can rephrase as "Should I do the moral act?" is 
analogous to "Could I do the possible act?" Once an act is admitted to be 
possible, the question answers itself--yes, of course you could do the 
possible. One an act is admitted to be moral, "Should I act morally?" 
answers itself—yes, of course you should do the moral act. So the answer to 
"Why should I act morally?" is: the self-answering "Should 1 act morally?" 
shows how it is the very nature of a moral act that it should be done. 
Rescher dismisses Prichard's analysis as perfectly correct but unhelpful in 
persuading to those who are already moral skeptics. Rescher tries to go 
beyond Prichard by arguing that one should be moral in order to make 
oneself proud to be a human. (96 & 101) But this collectivist and vague 
appeal is unsupported and unpersuasive. Further, Rescher's own reliance 
on the four commonsense moral distinctions above is similarly unpersuasive 
to moral skeptics Persuasiveness is overrated; it is enough for Prichard to 
be, as Rescher says he is, "perfectly correct." (89) One need not be able to 
persuade everybody in order to be correct. 
Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, Second Edition. By George Dickie, Richard 
Sclafani and Ronald Roblin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. $52.00 
Reviewed by Albert Cinelli, The University of Kansas 
When reviewing a book whose primary use is as an introductory 
textbook the essential question to ask is: how well does this book introduce 
and explain its field? One may also ask of an introductory book: is it 
balanced in its presentation? Is it comprehensive? Does it adequately 
present the main concepts and ideas addressed by a field? Does it transcend 
the individual biases of its authors? Most importantly: does it provide the 
student with instruction in the range, depth and significance of that field? A 
critical look at Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, edited by George Dickie, 
Richard Sclafani and Ronald Roblin, provides a mixed answer to these 
questions. 
The goal of this book, as the editors state it, is to: 
combine historical materials, works of recent scholarship 
and contemporary critical analyses in an effort to present a 
comprehensive account of the field of aesthetics as it is 
primarily understood in the Anglo-Saxon world (v). 
To this end, the authors present 48 essays, papers and book excerpts divided 
into five larger areas of aesthetic inquiry. The effort is made throughout to 
present these works in a "dialectical-critical" manner, with a piece presenting 
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an argument or point of view followed by a second and often a third piece 
that provide either criticism or counterpoint. Generally, the method is used 
to good effect, though with some limitations, chief among them, the limited 
focus and range of the selection of contemporary and traditional texts. 
The book is structured as follows: Part One addresses traditional 
theories of the arts supplemented by contemporary critiques of these 
theories. The intent here (Wimsatt and Beardsley's criticism of authorial 
intention aside) is to provide a variety of answers from the philosophical 
tradition to the fundamental aesthetic question: "what is art?" The section 
begins with the discussion of poetic inspiration from Plato's Ion and "the 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry" from Book X of the Republic. This is 
followed by Aristotle on "the nature of poetic imitation," from Poetics, and a 
commentary on both thinkers by Eva Schaper. Leo Tolstoy, Clive Bell and R. 
G. Col ling wood round out the traditional theories, with commentary on 
them by, respectively, Stanley Bates, Noel Carroll and Alan Tormey. These 
selections, like most in this book were selected to present substantial 
arguments, positions and ideas. The editors have sought to avoid giving 
mere "snippets" of texts. 
Part Two addresses contemporary theories of art and contemporary 
critiques of these theories. The section offers a generally Wittgensteinian set 
of linguistic theories of family resemblances and open concepts (Maurice 
Mandelbaum, Morris Weitz, Benjamin Tilghman) and a pro and contra 
discussion of the institutional theory of art (Arthur Danto, Anita Silvers, 
George Dickie, Robert Stecker). The editors show a partiality towards 
anglo-analytic philosophy of language. This is evident as the 
"contemporary" discussion is limited to a 1950s, late Wittgensteinian 
"antitheory" movement and an early sixties "institutional" theory to the 
exclusion of other, equally interesting and vital, contemporary theories of 
art. Contemporary marxist, poststructuralist, feminist and existential 
discussions of the theory of art, to cite a few examples, are nowhere 
addressed. Nonetheless, there are some good articles. Besides those from 
the authors mentioned above, Anita Silvers' "Once Upon a Time in the 
Artworld" proved to be instructional and Robert Steckers "The End of an 
Institutional Definition of Art" merits praise. 
Parts Three and Four discuss theories of the aesthetic, as distinguished 
from theories of art. The distinction involves a concern with matters of taste 
and aesthetic attitude over and above the physical work of art itself. Part 
Three presents traditional theories of the aesthetic along with contemporary 
discussions of these theories. The emphasis here is on the traditional role of 
taste in aesthetic theory. Hutcheson and Hume introduce the British 
tradition with Peter Kivy and Mary Mothersill providing commentary. They 
are supplemented by Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment from The 
Critique of judgment with Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer providing commentary. 
These selections are interesting, though again, they are limited to a particular 
list of authors. Other views, such as the eighteenth century neo-platonism of 
Johann Winkelmann, or Edmund Burke's other than Kantian commentary on 
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the sublime, to name two, are alluded to in individual articles though not 
given any significant discussion. The question of what sanctifies a given 
reading list as "traditional," as representing "the tradition," is left an open 
one by the editors. 
Part Four, which presents contemporary theories of the aesthetic with 
contemporary criticism also offers some interesting articles though it is 
somewhat narrowly conceived. Edward Bullough's concept of "Psychical 
Distance," Jerome Stolnitz on the Aesthetic Attitude, and Frank Sibley on 
"Aesthetic Concepts" are presented as contemporary theories of the aesthetic, 
even though Bullough's 1912 article is more contemporary with Tolstoy and 
Collingwood, the "traditionalists" of Part One, and Stolnitz and Sibley's 1959 
and 1960 articles are older even than most graduate students. The 
anthology's critical-dialectical method is at its most strained in this section as 
George Dickie and Ted Cohen make merely dismantling attempts at 
refutation. To say, as Dickie does, that all aesthetic attitudes fail is to hold to 
an "antitheory" skepticism that is, perhaps, no longer, 'the hottest thing 
going.' I found Ted Cohen's attempt at logically "dissolving" Sibley's 
Aesthetics/Non-Aesthetics distinction to be an example of the "analytic" 
approach at its worst, a mere hammering away at a mostly heuristic 
distinction. This section, especially, would have been a good place to bring 
in some other theoretical approaches. One wonders why, for example, an 
article expressing a pragmatist theory of aesthetics was not included. An 
exception to this complaint is Kendall Walton's article "Categories of Art," 
which provides an interesting, and more recent (1970), account of the 
relationship of categories of art to actual artworks. His discussion of the 
perception of Picasso's Guernica as a painting or as a "guernica" was 
particularly thought provoking. 
After setting the terms of debate in Parts One through Four-giving 
answers, traditional and contemporary, to the questions "what is art?" and 
"what is the aesthetic?" the book moves, in Part Five, to a presentation of six 
series of discussions on categories of the individual arts: literature, drama, 
the plastic arts: painting and architecture, film, music and dance. The 
editors' goal is to broaden the aesthetics discussions of the earlier sections of 
the book by examining aesthetic discourse in relation to individual regions 
of the arts. However, the same problem of limited focus in the selection of 
essays is evidenced here as throughout the book. 
The section on literature is a case in point. Its focus is on "intention and 
style in the literary work." It includes one article by Monroe Beardsley, and 
another, "The Intentional Fallacy," co-authored by Beardsley and William K. 
Wimsatt. It also includes commentary and counter-argument by Colin Lyas 
and Jenefer Robinson. The Beardsley article attempts to set some criteria for 
judging the parameters of literature and ends with an affirmation of a 
moderated formalism. The Beardsley-Wimsatt article, a standard text from 
the "New Criticism" movement of the 1950s, attempts to move critical 
inquiry away from a literary or historical speculation about authorial 
intention. Lyas' piece gives a direct response to Beardsley-Wimsatt, while 
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Robinson attempts to provide a theoretical account of the nature of authorial 
style. The discussion in this section is thus limited to the formalistic 
understanding of literature that is the analog in criticism of the analytic 
method in philosophy. Again, one wonders whether a wider range of 
theory could not have been introduced. Perhaps this is also where the 
editors' dialectical-critical method should have been less strictly adhered to, 
allowing several perspectives to be presented, rather than just one point of 
view, followed by counterpoint. This criticism follows for most of the 
remaining sections. 
The section on the theory of drama is one of the few that gets outside of 
the narrow analytic focus. This section features Nietzsche's discussion of the 
apollinian and dionysian in tragedy, with Richard Schacht providing 
commentary. It is interesting that this passage from Nietzsche was retained 
from the first edition while passages from other "nonanalytic" theorists such 
as Hegel, Suzanne Langer, even Marcel Duchamp were not. As a personal 
note, it was this section in the first edition of Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology 
that, as an undergraduate, began my own significant association with the 
thought of Nietzsche. In his response to the Nietzsche selections, Richard 
Schacht points to Nietzsche's ideas of overcoming and transformation as the 
central ideas of his theory of art. It would have been interesting for editors 
to have given some more recognition to contemporary theorists who have 
followed in the wake of Nietzsche. The editors, however, seem oblivious to 
those critics and theorists. 
The next section offers a discussion on the questions of representation, 
meaning and truth in the plastic arts: painting and architecture. E. H. 
Gombrich, Richard Wollheim and Nelson Goodman contribute articles. The 
selection from Gombrich's Art and Illusion speculates on the way 
representation is shaped by the purposes to which it is put. Wollheim 
responds to Gombrich and poses some interesting questions tin the nature of 
the history of art. Goodman follows with a discussion of "how buildings 
mean." He addresses such issues as the role of interpretation in under-
standing "the meaning" of a building and the aesthetic significance of a 
building's physical impact on its surroundings. 
The section on the theory of film, subtitled "metaphysical reflections," 
includes: a selection from The World Viewed, by Stanley Cavell, a response to 
Cavell by Stanley Bates and a further essay by Alexander Sesonske. These 
essays are fairly interesting though the focus of this section seems to be on 
mainstream, "classic" films of Hollywood (a point of criticism noted by 
Bates). Sesonske does deliver an interesting excursus on the question of 
"what is film." Sesonske even provides some metaphysical reflections on the 
aesthetics of the "chase scene" in film--as a way of displaying cinematic 
space, time and motion. While the section on film focuses on popular film, 
the section on music emphasizes the question of expressiveness in "serious," 
classical music. Eduard llanslick's "A Musical Theory of Sound and 
Motion," from ()// the Musically Beautiful gives a nineteenth century case as to 
why Brahms is a better composer than Wagner. In teaching this essay, it 
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would be useful to pose Nietzsche's apollinian and dionysian discussion as 
counterpoint. Edward T. Cone and Renee Cox present more recent views in 
the debate between formalism and expressiveness in music. The form 
versus feeling debate in music is an old one. Here, Hanslick defends form, 
Cone defends feeling, while Cox attempts a synthesis. 
A section on the theory of dance rounds out Aesthetics: A Critical 
Anthology. Francis Sparshott's essay "Why Philosophy Neglects the Dance" 
begins the section. It poses some interesting speculations on why "the 
dance," does not receive the philosophical-aesthetic scrutiny accorded other 
forms of art. The essay also makes one of the collection's few references to 
Hegel, arguably a pivotal figure in the history of aesthetics (the reference is 
to why Hegel neglects the dance). Monroe Beardsley offers another critical 
analysis, titled "What is Going on in a Dance?" Noel Carroll and Sally Banes 
conclude the anthology with a critique of Beardsley that poses some pointed 
questions of the avant-garde in dance as resistant to the attempts at clarifying 
definition that typify Beardsley's framework of aesthetic analysis. 
There are a number of flaws with Aesthetics: a Critical Anthology. The 
dialectical-critical method used in this book, while meritorious in principle, 
works to limit the range of aesthetic discussion presented. Occasionally the 
respondents both enlighten and explain the original text or provide thought 
provoking refutation. Often, however, the approach is forced, with the 
criticism ending up in nitpicking attack. Moreover, while the readings and 
responses do not all present a single point of view, the respondents must 
respond to the theses according the limited terms of debate set by the 
original article. This limits the scope of the book's aesthetic inquiry. The 
problem of narrowness has become more pronounced in the second edition 
of Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology. The first edition of the anthology, 
published in 1978, contained readings from Hegel, Clement Greenberg, 
Suzanne Langer, even Marcel Duchamp. 
In limiting themselves, in the second edition, to the rather oxymoronic 
notion of the "analytic tradition," or the curious phrase "anglo-saxon world," 
(the books also contains numerous typographical errors) the editors exclude 
much that is of philosophical merit in current discussions of aesthetic issues. 
'Traditional" authors such as Longinus of Colonus, Johann Winkelmann and 
Hegel ought to be given some place alongside Aristotle, Frances Hutcheson, 
Tolstoy and Kant. Contemporary continental authors, among them: Roland 
Barthes, Martin Heidegger, Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida (to name a 
few) have contributed as much or more to contemporary discussions of 
aesthetics as the book's "analytic" theorists. They also belong in a work that 
purports to be a "critical anthology" of aesthetic theory. To the objection that 
at 678 pages already, there simply is not room for more perspectives, one 
wonders, for example, whether there is a need for three articles by Monroe 
Beardsley at the expense of Roland Barthes; or whether some of the articles 
are not just "filler" intended to flesh out the editors dialectical-critical 
approach. Indeed, an age of multi-culturalism and the breaking down of 
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disciplinary boundaries, the restriction of aesthetic discussion to the analytic 
"tradition" is almost reactionary. 
Though to be fair, a number of women theorists, albeit analytic ones, do 
appear in this textbook. In conclusion, Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology 
exhibits a certain conservativism that is not in keeping with the dynamism 
and multiplicity that stand as hallmarks of artistic expression, the things that 
make artistic endeavor worth practicing and noticing. This anthology would 
be improved by some more effort to grasp this dynamism and to provide 
balance and comprehensiveness in presenting and introducing the range of 
aesthetic inquiry. 
John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism. Steven C. Rockefeller. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Reviewed by Deborah Heikes. 
Throughout his life and career John Dewey shunned any sort of dualism 
or dichotomy and, as a result, was a philosopher for whom thought and life 
were intimately connected. Dewey's philosophy and life experience cannot 
be divorced without significant distortion of either, for if there is one thing 
Dewey sought above all else it was a thoroughgoing unity in his own life 
and of his life with the life of the society in which he lived. Recognizing the 
fundamental impact Dewey s life had on his thought (and vice versa), Steven 
C. Rockefeller in John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism 
attempts to address the religious element of Dewey's thought by examining 
it not only in the context of Dewey s philosophy as a whole but also in the 
context of the biographical and historical element that served to shape and 
influence Dewey's philosophic thought. 
Rockefeller divides Dewey's religious thought into six stages. The first 
two of these stages cover Dewey s childhood and college years (including 
the three years preceding Dewey's matriculation at Johns Hopkins), and in 
the first chapter of this book, Rockefeller skillfully traces the influences on 
Dewey's life and thought during his formative years in Vermont. In particu-
lar, Rockefeller shows how the faith in a democratic ideal that Dewey pro-
fessed throughout his career was instilled by Dewey's mother, his church, 
and his teachers so that it acquired an important moral and religious 
significance that was to underlie all of Dewey's thought. 
The third stage of Deweys religious thought, as identified by Rocke-
feller, began when Dewey entered Johns Hopkins as a graduate student, 
during which time Dewey was introduced to Hegelian idealism. Rockefeller 
discusses how in Hegel Dewey found the vision of organic unity for which 
he had eagerly sought during his years in Vermont and how Dewey was 
influenced by George Sylvester Morris and G. Stanley Hall, from whom 
Dewey gained many of the foundational tenants of his mature philosophy. 
Rockefeller also includes in this period a discussion of Dewey's attempt to 
unify philosophy and psychology and an explication of how this integrated 
psychology and philosophy related to Dewey's conception of science, 
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morality, and religion. One of Rockefeller's main contentions is the 
interConnectivity and inseparability of these three disciplines throughout 
Dewey's work, and throughout this bix>k, Rockefeller does an excellent joy 
of portraying the relationship of these elements in every aspect of Dewey's 
philosophy. 
When Dewey graduated and began his first job as a professor of philos-
ophy, his social consciousness, which had been instilled in him from his 
youth, was aroused. The absolute idealism of Dewey's student days gave 
way to what Rockefeller calls a radical version of liberation theology and to 
a political radicalism. This transition marked the end of the third stage of 
Dewey's religious thought and the beginning of a new stage in which, 
Rockefeller maintains, Dewey's conception of God was transformed to one of 
naturalized immanence; God became for Dewey a creature who realizes its 
being through the history of humanity's evolving social and cultural life. 
This period encompasses the decade Dewey spent at the University of 
Michigan, and Rockefeller traces not only the intellectual influences on 
Dewey s developing thought but also the relationship of Deweys philosophy 
to external influences such as his addresses to and involvement with the 
Student's Christian Association, his friendship with Franklin Ford and the 
"Thought News affair," his emerging friendship with Jane Addams, and his 
romance with and subsequent marriage to Alice Chipman. In fact, 
Rockefeller offers a well-rounded view of Dewey as an individual and 
provides a clear view of how Dewey's thought evolved and matured as he 
moved away from neo-Hegelian idealism and toward an experimental 
naturalism. Rockefeller indicates how, during this time, Dewey began to 
break away from the Congregational Church in particular and traditional 
Christianity in general; yet Rockefeller also takes great pains to demonstrate 
how Dewey sought to retain the essence of the Christian faith in both his life 
and his thought. 
The final two periods of religious thought that Rockefeller identifies 
deal with Dewey's mature philosophy, but Rockefeller continues to indicate 
how Dewey's youthful experiences and his earlier philosophical outlook 
served as the foundation for the development of his mature thought. 
The fifth period of Dewey's religious thought began when Dewey left 
the University of Michigan and became the chair of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Chicago. During this time Dewey's thought 
came to focus around the problems of individual self-realization and 
freedom, democratic social reconstruction, and the scientific search for 
practical truth, and Rockefeller indicates how this led Dewey to take an 
active interest in education and pedagogy. Rockefeller centers his discussion 
around Dewey's theory of education and his faith in the democratic way of 
life, but Rockefeller integrates this discussion with an account not only of 
Dewey's involvement in the educational reform movement and in Sunday 
schools and public schools but also of Dewey's own personal tragedies 
during his decade at Chicago. 
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Also included in this fifth period of Dewey's religious thought is 
Dewey's move to New York City and Columbia University. As he does 
throughout the book, Rockefeller traces the intimate connection between 
Dewey's thought and life as Dewey entered into one of the most difficult 
periods of his life. While at Columbia Dewey sought through his philosophy 
an adequate conception of the nature of intelligence and its place in action in 
order to address the problems of humanity and in his life he functioned as 
both a teacher and reformer, who was involved in the formation of the 
AAUP, ACLU, and the NAACP, among other things. In addition to these 
positive accomplishments, however, the connection between Dewey's 
philosophic thought and his social activities was greatly affected by World 
War 1 and the strain it placed on Dewey as he contemplated the role of war 
in a democratic society and as he found himself arguing against pacifism. 
Rockefeller does an excellent job of portraying how the war affected both 
Dewey's professional and personal life and how it left him intellectually 
isolated and emotionally drained. With respect to Dewey's personal growth 
during the war years, Rockefeller devotes an entire chapter to Dewey's 
poems and letters and discusses Dewey's continuing emotional tie to the 
God of his childhood, his revealing correspondence with an amateur 
philosopher, and his interest in the Alexander technique and French 
painting. Rockefeller also discusses the regenerative impact Dewey's trip to 
China had on the embattled and weary philosopher. 
The sixth and final segment of Dewey's religious thought covers the 
period from Dewey's Gifford Lectures in 1929 until his death in 1952. Unlike 
his discussion of the previous periods of Dewey's thought, Rockefeller 
spends less time discussing Dewey's personal life during these years, rather 
the spotlight is placed more on Dewey's philosophical writing. During this 
period Dewey wrote Experience and Nature and The Quest for Certainty as well 
as A Common Faith, and in these works he provides his most complete 
statement of his understanding of the nature of the universe, the human 
situation, and the revelation of the ideal and the real. Rockefeller clearly 
explicates Dewey's position on each of these areas and shows how each 
ultimately relates to and is intimately connected with Dewey's philosophy of 
religion. In fact, these concluding chapters provide a wonderful overview 
and synopsis of Dewey's mature thought, for Rockefeller examines Dewey's 
thought on topics such as the integration of mind and matter, the character 
or experience, the moral life in an evolving world, Dewey's theory of action, 
his definition of truth, and his conception of social and economic reform. In 
covering Dewey's thought in each area, Rockefeller ties it into Dewey's 
larger project, the overcoming of all dualisms through a complete 
naturalization of metaphysics, epistemology, and religion. Rockefeller also 
provides an overview of the religious debate of the period and Dewey's 
place within it, and furthermore, he puts Dewey's religious view into 
perspective by showing its relation to Dewey's entire career. 
If there is one criticism I have of Rockefeller's book, it would have to be 
that I find it lacking any genuine critical element. Undoubtedly, Dewey is a 
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philosopher, educator, and social reformer of great merit and one of the 
United States towering intellectual figures; however, Rockefeller paints a 
portrait of Dewey that is almost too sympathetic. Several places in this book 
Rockefeller mentions either actual or potential criticisms of Dewey's thought, 
but rather than give these criticisms any serious consideration as challenges 
to Dewey, Rockefeller generally proceeds to provide Dewey s own response 
to the criticism, thereby seemingly dispersing any significant problem. 
Although Rockefeller's intention clearly is not to provide an exhaustive 
critical analysis of Dewey's religious thought, the lack of critical discussion 
at times can be disconcerting and can leave one with a sense that something 
is missing in this book. For example, in an early chapter Rockefeller offers 
an in-depth discussion of Dewey's conception God during his idealistic 
phase, yet although a clear and fundamental tension is evident in Dewey's 
position, Rockefeller does little more than merely mention the tension 
between theism and pantheism in Dewey's idealistic notion of God as an 
independent universal consciousness that is realized only through 
individual human beings. Rockefeller does return to this problem near the 
close of the book, and it is only at this juncture that he adopts a clearly 
genuine critical stance toward Dewey's religious perspective; yet even here 
the questions are merely raised and passed over. However, the difficulty 
raised is one central to Dewey's thought, and thus one that could potentially 
undermine much of Dewey's work. Put simply, Rockefeller discovers 
Dewey to be faced with a paradox: Dewey's notion of religious meaning and 
value entails a fundamental sense of ultimate meaning, but without some 
eternal truth beyond the nothingness of the destruction of nature there is no 
intelligible foundation for this ultimate meaning. Thus, Rockefeller finds 
that Dewey's naturalistic world view seems to point to some sort of 
transcendent dimension of reality. If Dewey's philosophy does indeed rely 
on a notion of transcendence, this is no small problem: the overarching goal 
of all of Dewey's thought was an elimination of dualisms, particularly a 
dualism between the transcendent and the immanent. Yet before Rockefeller 
moves on to his concluding chapter, there is little more than a mere 
indication that this might indeed provide some difficulty for Dewey. 
Despite the lack of critical assessment however, I found Rockefeller's 
book to be skillfully written, intellectually stimulating, and enjoyable. For 
those who are not familiar with Dewey s work or life, this book provides an 
interesting and informative overview of Dewey as a philosopher and as a 
man. For those who are familiar with Dewey, Rockefeller offers a unique 
perspective by focusing his discussion around the significance and role of 
religion in Dewey's life and thought. Rockefeller demonstrates how 
Dewey's own religious experience and the evolution of Dewey's religious 
consciousness served as the fundamental inspiration for his interpretation of 
religious experience in general but then proceeds to also locate Dewey's 
religious thought within the whole of Dewey's philosophical project. 
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Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique 
of Judgment, Rudolf A. Makkreel, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 171 pages. Reviewed by Christina Sharp, University of Kansas. 
Rudolf Makkreel's work Imagination and Interpretation is one among 
several recent attempts to interpret and expand the possibilities of Kant's 
critical project to the philosophy of language. He is interested in theory of 
interpretation based primarily on the "orientational" role played by the 
imagination throughout the Kantian corpus. Both theoretical judgments, as 
well as reflective judgments, will require the imagination to mediate 
between intuitions and concepts. In the former case, determinative concepts 
of objects are made possible, in the latter, indeterminate concepts or ideas, 
which serve heuristically, are produced. As mediator, the imagination will 
provide a criteria for the harmonization of parts to whole; Different relations 
of parts to whole, or particulars to universals determine the different types 
of judgments. Since, interpretation is only possible if parts of any object can 
be made sense of in relation to a whole, the imagination will play a pivotal 
role in interpreting experience, whether scientific, or merely aesthetic. As an 
interpretive principle, the imagination is seen to go beyond the formative 
powers of precritical writings and the synthetic function attributed to it in 
the Critique of Pure reason. 
Imagination focuses primarily on the third critique and reflective 
judgment- the judgment which allows us to identify which of our distinct 
faculties are being engaged by any given representation, sensory or 
conceptual. Makreel insists that the Critique of judgment (CJ) is not intended 
as a synthesis between the first and second critiques, the theoretical and the 
practical. He agrees with Hegel that if this is Kant's intention then CJ is a 
failure. Rather, Makreel insists that the in the CJ Kant's implicitly points to 
the transcendental role of the imagination as a principle or orientation which 
allows for a meaningful interpretation of individual representations, in 
terms of the systematicity of our representation in general. The imagination 
is central for both determining the concepts of understanding by the sensory 
manifold, and on the other hand generating ideas which allow for an 
integrated understanding of knowledge in general, but which go beyond 
determinate intuitions. Achieving this integration, or holistic view point, 
will require going beyond the constraints of theoretical judgments. 
Imagination is divided into three parts: the first parts is concerned with 
the precritical writings and the Critique of Pure Reason. The second part turns 
to reflective judgment as seen in aesthetic judgments, both of the beautiful 
and the sublime. The third part discusses the role of ideas, normal, aesthetic, 
and teleological as models for specification of empirical contents, and the 
way these models provide for "reflective interpretation". And finally, 
Makreel discusses common sense as a transcendental principle of 
orientation. 
In part one, Makreel traces the epistemological role of imagination in 
the precritical writings to the determinate role it plays in the theoretical 
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judgments of the first critique. Kant began his analysis of the imagination in 
his Reflections on Logic and his Reflections on Anthropology. In the precritical 
writings, the synthetic role of the imagination is not fully developed. Rather, 
the emphasis is on the "synoptic" and "formative" reproductive activities. As 
a formative faculty the imagination is related to what is directly given and 
indirectly given. At this stage, imagination is empirical and the differences 
between different functions of imagination are based on the temporal 
relationship of images to the immediate presentation of the object. Kant is 
very influenced in these early writings by Christian Wolff and A. G. 
Baumgarten's empirical psychology. 
Makreel outlines eight functions of the imagination in the precritical 
development of Kant's writings: Two of these—Ausbildung and Gegenbildung -
-will be relevant to the interpretive role of imagination in their ability to go 
beyond experience. The first is a "completing formation" when imagination 
projects" and idea of the whole" (19), while the second, is analogue formation 
where symbols act as linguistic signifiers forging links between sense and 
reason. These are developed inn later chapters. 
Three other species of image formation (Bildungsvermogen) are 
particularly interesting for Kant's later theory, in particular because of their 
'nieclion with time. Abbildung is direct image formation; Nachbildung 
•.. iuctive image formation), and Vorbidung (anticipatory image 
formation). Each are empirical images based on the past, present and future. 
Makreel is particularly interested to show that Abbildung is not only the 
representation of a present object, but also contains within it past images and 
anticipates future images. Hence, he argues Abbidung possesses "synoptic" 
capabilities insofar as it can contain in a moment all three relations of time. 
In doing so, Makreel argues a synoptic image will have spatial features. This 
is evident in Kant's discussion of an image of a city. Hence, Makreel 
concludes, "Abbildung provides an interesting starting point because it 
illustrates that even the most direct empirical images are formed" (19). 
These three image formations are developed further in Kant's "Lectures 
on Metaphysics." Here Abbildung is described as the process of "running 
through" and "gathering together" the different elements of a manifold. This 
description anticipates Kant's analysis of the apprehension of imagination in 
the CPR. Makreel offers a convincing critique of Heidegger's comparison in 
his well known work Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics of the three synoptic 
functions of the precritical writings, with the three synthesis of the first 
critique. There are important differences between these modes. Imagination 
in the precritical writings is merely empirical, being primarily reproductive 
and hence passive; whereas in the first critique, imagination is 
transcendental ( as well as reproductive) and plays a much more active role, 
i.e. the judgments inform objects, rather than merely receiving the imprint of 
objects, furthermore, Imagination is not only representation in time, but is 
seen actively generating time a priori through schematization (see CPR 
A143,B1820.) Unlike Abbildung, the synthesis of apprehension is not 
confined to the present, but represents a continuum of temporal moments, 
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rather than the concentrated or synoptic moment of Abbildung. Hence, it 
does not have the spatial connotations of synoptic imagination. 
In chapter 2, Makreel turns to the CPR and focus' on Kant's insistence 
that our representations must be "ordered, connected and brought into 
relation" (A99). These stages are evident in the three subjective synthesis: 
(l)The intuitive apprehension (2) imaginative reproduction and (3) 
conceptual recognition (20). These are discussed as cumulative, as well as 
"presuppositional" for each other. Makreel raises questions concerning the 
independence of the imagination from the understanding, arguing for an 
interpretation which would tie the two together. "Ultimately all synthesis is 
a function of the understanding and its categories" (28). Therefore, Kant's 
description in the precritical writings of image formation as origination from 
"below" is no longer possible in the first critique: Now "the sequence must 
begin with the synthesis of recognition" (28). It does not make any sense 
then to talk of a synthesis of apprehension apart from the concepts of 
understanding. Makreel dismisses several passages of the A edition (i.e. 
A78/B103), which suggest imagination as a synthetic faculty apart from 
understanding, as an oversight in Kant's editing. 
Makreel draws a distinction between the schemata of the pure concepts 
of the understanding and the schemata of pure sensible concepts. The first is 
transcendental and therefore without content, while the latter serves to 
mediate between concepts and intuitions. Transcendental schematism is 
said to be the imagination which schematizes by "translation the rule 
implicit in the categories into a temporally ordered set of instruction for 
construction of an objectively determinate nature" (30). This schemata "can 
never be brought into any image whatsoever" (CPR A142/B181) even 
though it is related to the production of the temporal schemata. 
The schemata of pure sensible concepts on the other hand, is called 
"figurative" by Kant. The graphic term suggests a spatial connotation. 
Makreel insists that on the one hand, these figurative schema should not be 
thought of as empirical images of reproductive imagination, but must be 
understood as "a rule for generating configurations of lines." On the other 
hand, figurative schema should not be confused with the intellectual ideals 
of reason which possess no content. Rather, they allows for the 
schematize tion of intuitions according to the categories of understanding, i. 
e. it makes images possible. These schema act as "monograms" (CPR 
A142/I81) or rules for the "generating of spatial forms" (32), thus, allowing 
for the discernment of patterns, e. g. mathematical patterns. These patterns 
or "mathematical cipher(s) become an intuitive replacement of the object (it 
is called a "sign in concreto))..." (34). It is not altogether clear whether 
Mackreel means to associate this synthesis with the synthesis of 
apprehension or the synthesis of imagination. He seems to collapse these 
two. 
Mackreel offers an interesting analysis of the interpretive applications of 
the productive imagination's use of monograms. Typically the term 
"monogram" is applied to a grouping of the letters of the alphabet. The 
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"deciphering" of discrete letters of the alphabet is compared with the 
schematization of intuition by the imagination. The "running through" of 
individual letters must happen before these discrete letters are joined 
together to form individual words so that they can be then "read." The 
imagination can be seen then to first, "decipher" entziffern) that which 
nature "spells" (buchstabieren) out in letters, and then to "read" (lessen) these 
letters as words. Makreel shows monogrammatic schema to be 
hermeneutically related to the transcendental schemata: . "If a 
monogrammatic schema of a pure sensible concept enables us to discern 
recurrent mathematical patterns in sense, then a transcendental schema of a 
pure intellectual concept indicates what kind of meaning can be predicated 
of objects of experience" (33). 
One indication of Kant's recognition of the hermeneutic import of his 
theory can be found in his use of the terms objekt and Gegenstände. The latter 
term has semantic connotations and suggests "objective meaning." Kant uses 
the term objekt to refer to that unity through which all the manifold in an 
intuition is united in a concept (CPR B139). But at the point where the 
understanding is said to become conscious of an object Kant uses the term 
Gegenstande. Hence, Makreel suggests "the imagination makes possible the 
crucial transition from logical meaning to objective meaning." 1 
A "reading" of nature does not however insure a complete interpretation 
of nature. It is possible to read the individual words in a sentence, taking 
note of their respective places in a linear progression. However, interpreting 
the sentence requires more than reading the individual words; it requires 
that each of the parts be understood in relation to the whole sentence. By 
analogy, the understanding is able to read nature, but it is not able to 
interpret nature. This involves a "completing function" of the imagination 
(Ausbildung) as it relates to reason: "If concepts of the understanding 
provide the rules for reading the manifold of sense so as to produce 
knowledge of objects in nature, then ideas of reason can be said to provide 
the rules for interpreting these objects so as to form a coherent and complete 
system of nature" (cf CPR A314/B370-71). In the Opus Postumum Kant 
distinguished between two types of "interpretation" (Auslegung) of nature, 
the one "doctrinal' and the other "authentic". Doctrinal interpretation is said 
to be "scholastic system" of physics, while the "authentic" interpretation is 
"experiential" physics. For Kant, interpretation must be connected with 
experience. Ideas will be valid heuristically for the interpretation of nature, 
only insofar as they relate to actual experience. In other words, Kant is not 
interested in metaphysical speculation. 
Before turning to a discussion of ideas, which occurs in part three, 
Makreel first discusses aesthetic judgments and the distinction between 
determinate and reflective judgments. The first two critiques deal with 
judgments where a universal concept is given and a particular is brought 
1 Makreel goes onto distinguish other valid uses of the term objetk in relation 
to intuitions (B156). 
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under the concept. Hence, the concept is determined by intuition. Reflective 
judgment, on the other hand, begins with given particulars. The reflective 
judgments are never determinate insofar as they do not bring intuitions 
under determinate concepts. Rather, they bring the particular qua particular 
in relation to either the subjective conditions of judgment in general, as is the 
case with judgments of taste, or ideas of Reason, as is the case with aesthetic 
and teleological judgments. 
Makreel begins with a discussion of judgments of taste which is the 
purest form of reflective judgment since it does not deal with any purposes 
or concepts. At this stage ideas do not enter into the picture. We are 
primarily concerned with our aesthetic responses to natural forms of 
beauty. Beautiful forms in nature are referred to as "Ciphers" 
(Chiffereschrift) through which nature speaks to us figuratively (CJ #42, 
143). These are analogous to the mathematical monograms produced by the 
synthesis of imagination in the CPR. Although, Kant never uses the term 
'synthesis' in reference to the imaginations role in aesthetic judgments, 
Makreel believes it is a mistake to assume he held aesthetic judgments to be 
epistemologically irrelevant. On the contrary, Makreel argues that Kant 
does not view aesthetic judgments as simply precognitive, but as important 
for "cognition in general." The difference is the way in which particulars are 
related to concepts. 
Judgments of taste are subjective, since they refer to the feeling of 
pleasure in the subject, rather than the object. These judgments are 
concerned with natural beauty (a point Makreel does not always make 
clear). The pleasure produced is disinterested, rather than an agreeable 
pleasure based on some instrumental use found for the object. As already 
mentioned, the judgment is pure, since it does not relate to an empirical 
object of desire. It is also important to distinguish judgments of taste from 
intellectual aesthetic ideas, since the judgment is not related to any specific 
purpose, and these as we shall see are related to moral purposiveness. The 
pleasure which is derived from judgments of taste occurs because of a 
"harmony' between faculties. This harmony is to be distinguished from the 
synthesis of the first critique where intuitions are "subordinated" to concepts. 
Rather, in harmony there is a "coordination" between faculties. 
Makreel insists in aesthetic consciousness "all the categories remain 
relevant to aesthetic judgments, but are used differently than in cognitive 
judgments" (53). The activity of the imagination in relation to (pure) 
concepts is analogous to the schematism in the first critique, but not identical 
to it. Kant claims that in reflective judgments the imagination, "schematizes 
without a concept. (CJ, #35, 129)" Instead of a schematism, Kant refers to 
this activity as a Presentation which includes "symbolization" and "reflective 
specification." If I am understanding Makreel correctly, reflective judgment 
"specifies the categories reflectively to organize pure mental contents" (53). 
It would appear that reflective judgment consists in taking an indeterminate 
unity, or aesthetically apprehended form and coordinating it with the 
different possible principles of cognition. What is "schematized" or better, 
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specified in the reflective judgment is the transcendental principles 
themselves. The "accord" between the aesthetic apprehension and the 
judging faculties in general produces pleasure: "The aesthetic judgment 
directly compares the apprehended form of an object with the way 
categories are generally schematized in relation to the form of time and it is 
this accord that is anesthetically pleasing" (58). In pure aesthetic judgments 
this coordination produces a "play" of the faculties, since there are no 
determinate intuitions. 
The transcendental principle that makes possible this coordination 
between the aesthetic form and the transcendental categories is "common 
sense." This principle enables us to orientate apprehended forms by 
specifying them according to different available principles: "Reflective 
judgment is concerned with the specification of universal concept of the 
understanding as concepts, in order to make it possible to classify objects 
into a system of genera and species." (57) Kant goes on to claim that 
reflective judgment "cannot undertake to classify the whole of nature by 
empirical differention unless it assumes that nature itself specifies its 
transcendental laws from some principle (FI, 20). This passage suggests the 
possibility of alternative transcendental principles, each co-existing. For 
example, it is possible to consider nature as directed by different types of 
causality, mechanical and teleological. Reflective judgment Is responsible 
for classifying these different types of causality, as applied to organic objects 
and inorganic objects. 
In the 4 and 5 chapters. Makreel examines the sublime and the feeling 
of life. The feeling of life provides a ground for the common sense revealed 
in the judgment of taste. In the case of the sublime the imagination connects 
the purposiveness of the judgment with the faculties of the subject, thus 
serving to bring to light the unity of the faculties. The inability of the 
imagination to comprehend mathematical infinity produces a regress that 
allows us to feel a sublime infinity with ourselves. "This regress is best 
understood transcendentally as the basis for an integration of the faculties" 
(87). Both 'common sense" and the "feeling of life" (also called spirit) are 
subjective transcendental principles which allow for the orientation and 
unity of the judging faculties. Makreel quotes Kant's Anthropology: "Spirit is 
what is truly creative what enlivens, because it is the unity from which all 
movement of the mind is derived" and from the same work, "the spirit of an 
art is whole, a systematic method, which contains a comprehensive idea." 
In Part II, Makreel elaborates in Chapter six, on the points made earlier 
concerning specification. Now specification is of empirical intuitions, rather 
than transcendental principles. He explains in detail how ideas, normal, 
aesthetic, and teleological, act as model images or archetypes which provide 
"the rules for judging whether an empirical figure accords with the 
archetype used by nature in producing its species" (61) These are not to be 
confused with ideals of reason, which are purely abstract and are not related 
to intuitions under universal concepts, Reason begins with an idea of the 
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whole and proceeds to interpret the parts in terms of that idea. These ideas 
are useful for interpreting nature, and symbolizing moral ideals. 
Normal ideas act as models for specifying empirical concepts. Aesthetic 
ideas are symbols of the good and provide a concrete object by which to 
understand the moral ideal of Reason. The guidelines provided by the ideas 
are revisable . Thus, reflective judgment is adaptable to particular 
experiences. Ideas act as organizing models of wholes, and can be changed 
to accommodate changes in the parts. Teleological judgments are explored 
in chapter seven, primarily in their application to history, particularly what 
is called "divinatory history", i.e.. history which assumes progress. The 
notion of amelioration requires a conception of teleos, a "sign of universal 
moral tendency in a particular factual event." (153) 
Where intuitions served as the matter for concepts, schematized 
concepts are seen as the matter for ideas. Ideas do not have any claim to 
theoretical knowledge. These ideas enable us to think of unities that go 
beyond the determinate judgment. This is important if the imagination is to 
able to provide a comprehensive idea of the whole, without ever 
determining the individual parts. Makreel sees the distinction between 
deciphering, reading, and interpreting as a differences between "the 
completing functions". The last of these is the function of ideas. 
In chapter eight, Makreel develops the full implications for a critical 
hermeneutics. Ultimately, the imagination acts as a faculty of orientation. 
We saw this first in the precritical writings in the discussion of Abbildung 
and later in the discussion of reflective judgments, as orientation "cognition 
in general" through the specification of the transcendental principles. In this 
final chapter, Makreel discussed the role of imagination in more detail as it 
relates to the "common sense." Here "common sense" Is understood as the 
belief in the universal communicability of my judgments. This is 
presupposed for every possible principle and judgment. It is a general 
feeling, without a concept, common sense suggest the possibility of a 
transcendental reflection. In his essay "What is Orientation in thinking" Kant 
distinguishes between two types of orientation: spatial orientation where an 
individual situates herself in relation to the external world; and "mental 
orientation" of the thinking self to the transcendental realm" In place of 
these determinate forms of orientation, Makreel suggests for reflective 
judgments a "Aesthetic orientation" and a "Teleological orientation." Hence, 
we see the importance of the imagination for gaining a perspective which 
will allow for interpreting different types of experience. 
At times Makreel seems to go beyond the explicit implications of Kant's 
corpus, but on the whole he does a good job of bringing to the fore the 
implicit possibilities for a theory of interpretation. His general point is at 
times lost in the details of his analysis. Sometimes this is due to poor 
organization of the chapters. Sometimes it is simply due to his pull from so 
many texts. He does not seem to consider the possibility of incongruities 
between the different texts and takes them for the most part as a consistent 
with one another. He is more interested in tracing the development of 
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imagination and suggests that the role it plays increases with each of Kant's 
writings. Whether this is by design or necessity is not altogether clear. 
Although Makreel's project is clearly in the continental Hermeneutical 
tradition, as evident in his discussion of his work in relation to Gadamer, 
Heidegger, and Kilthey, his clarity of style and careful analysis of the role of 
imagination should prove interesting for the analytic philosopher, as well. It 
is an important contribution to a little discussed topic in Kantian 
scholarship. 
